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THE CASE OF BULGARIA IN COMPARISON







tural Development in the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEESA) funded
under the EU 5th Framework Programme. The Project analyzed the context and
prospects for sustainable agricultural development in twelve Central and Eastern
European Countries (CEECs): Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hun-
gary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine. The re-
search group was composed of researchers from universities and research institutes
from these CEECs, as well as from the Humboldt University of Berlin, University of
Helsinki, Wageningen University, University of Newcastle upon Tyne and the FAO
Sub–RegionalOfficeforCentralandEasternEurope,Budapest.
The CEESA Project explored how the requirements of environmental protection and
natureconservationhavebeentakenintoaccountduringboththetransformationof
the political and economic institutions of the CEEC agricultural sectors and the
preparation for EU accession. Local case studies were conducted in each of the
above–mentioned CEECs. The findings were collected and subjected to detailed
scrutiny and discussion at the CEESA Policy Learning Workshops (PLWs), which
werefield–basedworkshopsthattookplaceintheCzechRepublic,BulgariaandPo-
land. This volume presents the results of the Bulgarian workshop; the Czech and
Polishworkshopsaredescribedinvolumes1and2,respectively.
The CEESA PLWs helped advance the creation of a pan–European research commu-
nity through the exchange of knowledge and by strengthening research partner-
ships and networks. We are confident that the results of the three CEESA PLWs will
contribute to the understanding and solving of problems that are at the interface of
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Irrigation and Water Regulation Systems in Transition: The Case of Bulgaria in Comparison with Latvia, East Germany and Romania1 IDEA AND METHODOLOGY
OF THE POLICY LEARNING WORKSHOPS
The CEESA Project brought together researchers from Central, Eastern and West-
ernEurope.Theirspecificaimwastoexplorehowtherequirementsofsustainability
have been incorporated in the restructuring of agriculture in the CEECs during tran-
sition and in preparation for EU accession. For many of the involved researchers it
was their first opportunity to participate in such a pan–European research project.
The researchers came from different research backgrounds and had worked in di-
versetheoretical,socio–economicandorganizationalcontexts.
Although the Project offered a common framework for analysis, different concep-
tions of the participants led to different interpretations. It became obvious that
a common understanding of the analytical framework required intensive discourse,
which could not be achieved in a short period of time. Similarly, the project partici-
pants had to cope with empirical heterogeneity. Recommendations for the restruc-
turing of various aspects of CEE agriculture (such as irrigation, landscape
managementorwaterprotection)wouldremainmeaninglessforEasternandWest-
ern European policy–makers if the context of transition were not sufficiently appre-
ciated. Such a context includes historical, ecological, economic, political and social
aspects.
These considerations called for an innovative approach to the exchange and com-
munication of knowledge. As a result, the idea of carrying out the Policy Learning
Workshops(PLWs)wasbroughtintothe CEESAProject.
The processes of transition, accession and enlargement should ultimately actualize
the concept of “Unity in Diversity”. Creating a common basis will hardly be
achievedifthesystemsandmethodsoftheWestaresimplytransplantedtoandcop-
iedbytheEast.EspeciallyinthefieldofenvironmentallysoundagriculturetheWest
cannot provide the ultimate, ready–made solutions which the East could simply im-
plement.
Whatisneededforsustainability,therefore,isatwofolddevelopment.Thisdevelop-
ment would draw on successful Western and Eastern examples and expertise and
would fully account for specific characteristics and the diverse circumstances of
Eastern European agriculture and rural areas. On the one hand, this development
involves building some basic institutions that resemble those in Western Europe.
On the other hand, it calls for innovative solutions that are well adapted to local cir-
cumstances and created with the participation of all affected actors. In this respect
a pressing need remains for mutual learning among scientists and experts from
WesternandEasternEuropeancountries.
As previously mentioned, these insights led to the idea of carrying out the PLWsa s
part of the CEESA research process. In a microcosm, the CEESA Project experienced
1
Irrigation and Water Regulation Systems in Transition: The Case of Bulgaria in Comparison with Latvia, East Germany and Romaniathe transnational exchange and mutual learning that ideally characterizes the over-
all process of European integration. The PLWs were carried out after a one–year re-
search period during which the case–study authors had prepared detailed
background information on the topic under investigation. Each of the PLWs was
preceded by a 4–day study tour, which brought together the various CEESA teams
thathadinvestigatedsimilartopics.Thesetoursallowedtheteams(researching,for
example, irrigation, landscape management or water protection) to conduct joint
fieldwork ‘on the spot’ in relation to the host country's case study. The results of the








Irrigation and Water Regulation Systems in Transition: The Case of Bulgaria in Comparison with Latvia, East Germany and Romania2 DESCRIPTION OF THE BULGARIAN
IRRIGATION CASE
DuringtransitiontheamountofwaterusedforirrigationinBulgariahassharplyde-
clined. In addition, the share of actually irrigated areas is small compared with the
share of those that could be irrigated. Large sections of existing irrigation systems
are abandoned, and the ones still in use are barely maintained. Crops such as wheat
andbarleyhavereplacedmorewater–intensivecrops,includingvegetables,riceand
maize. This situation impacts the development of agriculture and the allocation of
the country's water resources. In addition, poorly functioning irrigation systems
have a long–lasting impact on the environment. If the water supply from the irriga-
tion systems is not reliable, the farmers will switch to pump irrigation; in the long
run this will affect groundwater resources. Furthermore, the improper operation of
canalscanresultinwaterloggingandsoilsalinization.
Thecentralargumentofthisreportisthatinthewakeofdecollectivizationandresti-
tution land fragmentation has contributed to the abandonment of irrigation sys-
tems. The irrigation systems in Bulgaria were originally designed to serve large
water users. Now these systems are supposed to distribute water to a large number
of small plots. This condition, however, has not been reflected by a change in the re-
spectiveinstitutions.
This report focuses attention on the main institutional elements regarding water re-
sources and irrigation. The institutional settings include the property–rights system














Formal property rights were investigated by reviewing relevant laws. The institu-
tional settings were investigated by conducting semi–structured interviews with in-
volved actors. These interviews were carried out in the region around the town of
3
Irrigation and Water Regulation Systems in Transition: The Case of Bulgaria in Comparison with Latvia, East Germany and RomaniaPlovdiv. Most of this region's agricultural land has irrigation systems (though many
areunused)andmuchofthecountry'sgroundwaterresources.
2.1 Privatization Process in Bulgarian Agriculture
During socialism, large production units (cooperatives and agro–industrial com-
plexes) organized agricultural production in Bulgaria. Private farming was allowed
only on small plots, but even then individual farmers were dependent on the cooper-
atives.
Landreformwasinitiatedatthebeginningof1991bystartingtoliquidatethecoop-
eratives and reallocate the agricultural land to individual owners. Land in Bulgaria
wasnevernationalized,andthereforefromalegalpointofviewthislandreformwas
actually an act of restitution as it changed formal property rights into effective prop-
ertyrightsagain.Theownershipoflandparcelswasrestoredtopreviousowners(or
their heirs). The real or comparable boundaries that existed before collectivization
(duringthe1950s)wereused.
Nevertheless, there have been problems even after land reform. Land ownership in
Bulgaria prior to collectivization was highly fragmented, and the restitution process
deepened this problem even further (Table 1). Those that had owned land before
1950 (before collectivization) are too old to farm and some have already passed
away. In addition, many of them have several heirs living in towns who have little or
no experience in agriculture and no intention of returning to the villages. Soon after
the cooperatives were abolished, new producer cooperatives were established in al-
most every village. The opportunities for establishing private farms were con-
strainedbyalackoftradition,landfragmentationandalackofresources.Moreover,
frequent changes in legislation and the decline of the food processing industry cre-
ated great uncertainty and further hindered the development of stable production
units.
In addition to these problems, the land restitution process was slow and contradic-
tory. When the formal procedures for land reform ended in 2000, Bulgarian farm
structurewasdominatedbythreegroups:smallsubsistencefarms(operatedbypeo-
ple near retirement), cooperatives (most in a poor financial state) and large com-
mercialfarms.Thenumberofmedium–sizedfamilyfarmsremainedsmall.
Although irrigation is very important for Bulgarian agriculture, until the end of the
Second World War only a small share of the land was irrigated. During the 1960s
the state initiated an extensive programme to increase the share of irrigated land.
Since cooperatives were the dominant organizational form, irrigation systems were
designedtosupplywatertotheselargeproductionunits.Themainsourcesforwater
supply were the lakes of large dams located in the mountains and rivers. Groundwa-
terwasusedasacomplementarysource.
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Upto0.2 915217 51.5 83101.7 3.2 0.09
0.2–0.5 363564 20.4 118412.8 4.5 0.33
0.5–1 256442 14.4 180535.2 6.9 0.70
1–2 156473 8.8 214634.0 8.2 1.37
2–5 68474 3.9 205148.1 7.8 2.99
5–10 13446 0.8 90299.3 3.5 6.72
Above10 3506 0.2 1728427.0 65.9 492.99
Total 1777122 100.0 2620558.1 100.0 1.48
Source:TheAgrarianReport(1999)
The process of reorganizing irrigation started at the beginning of 1999 after parlia-
ment approved the Water Law (State Gazette, 1999). In 2001, two additional acts
wereissued,theWaterUserAssociationLaw(StateGazette,2001a)andtheExecu-
tive Hydromelioration Agency Structural Rules (State Gazette, 2002b). These three
documents form the backbone of irrigation reform. They specify the legal property
rights to water and irrigation infrastructure and also define the main organizational
rules.
Irrigationreformstartedwhenthelandrestitutionprocesswasapproachingitsend.
The investments in irrigation systems are specific to the site and capital required.
Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that this may also have caused problems. In
Germany(Schleyer,2002)andLatvia(Busmanisetal.,2002),irrigationreformwas
implemented more quickly than in Bulgaria. However, the phenomenon of aban-
doned irrigation and drainage systems was observed in all these countries. There-
fore,otherinstitutionalreasonshavealsoinfluencedtheprocess.
2.2 Formal Property Rights on Wand Irrigation Infrastructure
The Water Law, passed in 1999, granted state, municipal and private ownership to
water resources. Water resources in Bulgaria are generally state–owned with some
exceptions. Spring water and natural lakes on community–owned land are consid-
ered municipal property. Private ownership is allowed only for water located on pri-
vate land (wells, springs within property borders and artificial or natural lakes that
arenotfedbywatersourcesfromstateorcommunalproperty).Landownerscanuse
water from wells up to certain limit free of charge. Above the limit they must apply
for permission and pay a tax. In addition, all wells must be registered in the local
5
Irrigation and Water Regulation Systems in Transition: The Case of Bulgaria in Comparison with Latvia, East Germany and Romaniamunicipality. The law also specifies the sanctions for times when water resources
are used without the required permission, when water use and monitoring rules are
violated, when irrigation infrastructure is damaged and when water resources are
polluted.
Three ministries and a number of government offices manage the water infrastruc-
ture. At the national level, the Ministry of Environment and Water conducts water
management. Basin Offices are supposed to coordinate water usage activities at the
regional level. There are four water regions and they are specified in the Water Law
(shown in Figure 1). The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry is responsible for the
irrigation systems (the main canals and some of the large dam lakes). The state firm
IrrigationSystems,Ltd.conductsthemanagementofthesesystems.TheMinistryof
RegionalDevelopmentandPublicWorksisresponsibleforhouseholdwatersupply.
The Energy Committee is responsible for the electric power stations and the large
water dams. The government intends to transfer management of the internal canal
systemandsomesmalldamstowateruserassociations.
In summary, land restitution in Bulgaria has led to land fragmentation. Coopera-
tives, which coordinated not only agricultural activity but also the village's social
life, were abolished before alternative forms emerged. Formal legislation regarding
irrigationisalreadyinplace,butmostofithasnotbeenputintopractice.
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Figure 1: The Water Regions in Bulgaria2.3 Institutional Settings in Practice
In order to investigate the problem of irrigation system abandonment at the local
level, interviews were conducted in the Plovdiv region. This region is located in the
Western part of the Trakia plain along the Maritza river. The main crops grown in
theareaarefruits,vegetablesandrice.Theregionisrichinwaterresources.Maritza
is the biggest Bulgarian river. About 40 percent of all the country's groundwater re-
sources are located here. Irrigation systems are built on 80 percent of the agricul-
tural land; however, during the last several years most of them have not been under
operation.Therearefourlargeand263smallwaterdams.
The firm Irrigation Systems, Ltd. has two branches in the area. The first one, Irriga-
tion Systems, Ltd., Plovdiv–North, organizes the water supply north of the Maritza
Riverwheremostriceproductionislocated.Thesecondbranch,IrrigationSystems,
Ltd., Plovdiv–South, serves the area south of the river. Small agricultural producers
dominate this region. Interviews were conducted with both branch managers of the
irrigationcompany.
The Union of Rice Producers is an organization of farmers and processors involved
inthericeindustry.Riceproducersareamongthebiggestandbest–organizedwater
users in the Plovdiv region. An interview was conducted with the secretary of this
union. The development of water user associations (WUAs) in the region was sup-
ported by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and the World Bank. Currently,
theyoperateundertheCooperativeandTradelaws.Interviewswereconductedwith
fourrepresentativesof WUAs.Thefinalsampleiscomprisedof49interviews.These
interviews included 3 producer cooperatives, 3 large rice producers, 2 water dam
tenantsand4wateruserassociations,whiletherestareindividualproducers.
Drawing on Ostrom (1992), the following elements of governance structures were
investigated: existing monitoring system, pricing mechanisms, management and
coordination and conflict–resolution and sanction mechanisms. Water is supplied
through a hierarchy by the firm Irrigation Systems, Ltd., which enjoys a state mo-
nopoly in irrigation. Currently cooperation is weakly developed at the village level.
Themarket,intermsoftradingwaterrightsorquotas,isnon–existent.
Monitoring.Beforetransition,thequantityofwaterusedwasmeasuredatthemain
canal exits. The cooperatives were responsible for water usage on their territory and
paid according to watermeter readings. During the transition, water has still been
measuredattheofficialmaincanalexits.However,inmanyplacesthecanalsarede-
liberatelydestroyedbywaterusers,andthewaterflowsontotheirplots.
Water theft is viewed differently by the managers of the two branches of Irrigation
Systems,Ltd.AccordingtothemanagerofIrrigationSystems,Ltd.,Plovdiv–North,
stealing water is not a serious problem for the firm. Water is inexpensive and only
smallproducerscanstealwaterwithoutbeingnoticed.Accordingtothemanagerin-
terviewed, the main problems are the large water losses within the systems due to a
7
Irrigation and Water Regulation Systems in Transition: The Case of Bulgaria in Comparison with Latvia, East Germany and Romanialackofmaintenanceandthestealingofirrigationequipment.Thesetwofactorspose
serious threats to the water supply in his region. Water guards control the main ca-
nals; however, according to farmers and the managers of Irrigation Systems, Ltd.
this protection is considered inadequate for the area they serve. According to the
manager of Irrigation Systems, Ltd., Plovdiv–South, water theft is a problem that
does affect water supply in his region. Though small producers are the main cul-
prits, he says that “..They are small but many, and the monitoring is expensive…
Small producers not only steal water from the firm, but they also disturb the water
supplytolargeproducers.”Healsoconsidersprotectingirrigationequipmentanur-
genttask.
The managers have different opinions because of the structure of production and
thetypeoffarmsinbothregions.Riceproductionisprominentinthenorthernarea,
and the farmers cultivate larger plots. In the southern region, most of the water us-
ers are small. Internal canal systems are rarely guarded and water is not monitored.
Agricultural producers rarely participate in the monitoring process; they report
thievesonlyifwaterisscarce.
Waterpricingmechanism.ThelocalbranchesofIrrigationSystems,Ltd.calculate
average prices per cubic metre of water. The water price is determined by two fac-
tors: operation costs and area expected to be irrigated. These prices are then pre-
sented for approval to the central office of the firm in Sofia. After correction, the
prices are given to the local branches. The water price is below the delivery costs,
and the firm receives subsidies from the state. Because the irrigation firm is
state–owned,subsidiesfromthestatetothisfirmcanbeproblematic.Forlargeagri-
cultural producers and water dam tenants, the water price is measured in cubic
metres. For small producers, it is measured in hectares because of monitoring diffi-
culties. Two factors determine the water price per hectare: water price per cubic
metre and the watering norm of crops. The water price is doubled if an agricultural
producer uses more than a certain amount above the norm. Water user associations
have certain privileges, one of which are lower water prices. Generally, only a few of




difficulties when only small areas need to be irrigated. In this type of case per–unit
water delivery costs are high, and the price is predetermined; therefore the firm in-
curslossesifonlyoneproducerrequireswater.Toeasethisproblem,themanagerof
Irrigation Systems, Ltd., Plovdiv–South is trying to collect more requests before re-
leasing water in the canals. This strategy, however, is not always possible because
agricultural producers in the area grow different crops that require irrigation at dif-
ferent times and also have different resistance towards drought. Because of this dif-
ficulty the irrigation company avoids signing contracts with small producers.
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violated. After water is released into the internal canals, farmers have to protect the
waterthattheypaidforfromnon–eligiblewaterusers.Asaresultofthelandrestitu-
tion process some farmers own parcels of land far away from the canals whereas
othersarenearby.Thissituationhasalsoaggravatedtheconflictsderivingfromwa-
teraccess.
Conflict resolution. There are at least two types of conflicts surrounding the distri-
bution of water. The first type – between the irrigation company and water users –
concerns regularity of water supply, water tax collection, water theft and damage of
irrigation equipment. The second type – among water users – concerns water distri-
bution.
In case a conflict arises, Irrigation Systems, Ltd.'s water guards or local mayors are
expected to solve it. Water guards, however, usually avoid getting involved in con-
flicts because they are often local people integrated into the rural society, and also
because they are supposed to serve a large area. In some villages, an interviewee
stated, violators do not respect the water guards and their orders. Some of the inter-
vieweesbelievedthatonlyoutsiderscouldimposeeffectivecontroloverwaterusage.
In addition, they thought that the water guards' salaries should be connected with
the water taxes they collect. In other villages interviewees think that the water
guards'ordersareobeyedandtheyaredoingagoodjob.
The manager of Irrigation Systems, Ltd., Plovdiv–South avoids hiring water guards
from the local population. He also complains that the law has not equipped the wa-




regional policies. Although solving conflicts concerning irrigation is not among
their obligations, very frequently they are asked to solve conflicts because the mem-
bers of the communities respect them. In such a situation, they sometimes act as
mediators. However, as they also represent the state authority their role as a neutral
mediator can have its problems. The social mechanisms for conflict resolution are
underdeveloped.Forthatreasonviolenceisafrequentlyappliedmechanismforcon-
flict resolution, and those farmers who are closer to the canal or have more relatives
orfriendsinthefieldusuallywinadispute.
Sanctioning mechanisms. Most of the interviewees did not know of anybody who
had been charged for violating the rules. However, several years ago in the village of
Tcalapitca, some water users were taken to court by Irrigation Systems, Ltd. for not
paying for water. Unfortunately, access to information about the court decisions is
restricted.
9
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bringing violators to court is long, expensive and inefficient. First, the water guards
must detect the violation, and then witnesses must certify it. Violence frequently
overrides the law. Water guards can be seen armed and violators are held account-
ableonthespot.
IrrigationSystems,Ltd.refusestoprovidewatertoagriculturalproducerswhohave
not paid all their water fees in previous years. There are several conditions, however,
thatmaylimitthesuccessofthisstrategy.First,itisdifficulttoexcludeaviolatorfrom
irrigation,especiallywhenhisplothasafavorablepositioninrelationtothecanalsys-
tem. In this case, the threat of the water supplier would not be credible. Second, the
threat is credible if the whole branch of the system is isolated and the other agricul-
tural producers would not be able to irrigate. By using collective punishment the wa-
ter supplier would either lose revenues and clients, or the violator would be forced to
pay because of social sanctioning. However, this strategy could be successful only for
smallirrigationsystemsorinacaseinvolvinglargewaterusers.
Water resources and infrastructure for water distribution. None of the small
farmers interviewed who were using water from wells or directly from a river were
paying for it. Furthermore, the private wells had not been registered, as the law re-
quires.
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Figure 2: Destroyed Irrigation EquipmentIrrigation Systems, Ltd. is legally responsible for the main canals. These canals are
usable, but the losses in the systems are high. Additional investments are needed to
reduce water losses. The resources for the investment are difficult to accumulate be-
cause revenues from the irrigation systems are insufficient. Revenue levels are low
partiallybecauseofthedifficultiesposedbyexistingmonitoring,conflict–resolution
and sanctioning mechanisms. Furthermore there is a lack of resources because Irri-
gation Systems, Ltd. is a state company. The company owners (the state) have
rent–seekingincentivesbecausethedeficitsarecoveredbythestate(seeSection3.2).
Currently many internal canals are the responsibility of local municipalities. How-
ever, they are supposed to transfer the rights to manage the systems, and later their
full property rights, to the water user associations. Active water user associations,
however, are still rare. In most of the villages where the interviews were conducted,
local municipalities did not maintain the internal canal systems. Revenue levels
from local businesses were low or insignificant. Financial resources from the state
are not provided for the purpose of canal maintenance. Moreover, in many places
the canals were destroyed, and where they were operating, the water users and (in
somecases)municipalitiesmaintainedthem.
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Figure 3: Maintenance of Internal Irrigation CanalsThe small water dams, as part of the internal irrigation systems, are also the respon-
sibility of local municipalities. Individuals who operate fisheries in these dams rent
themfromlocalmunicipalities.Thetenantshardlymaintainthedams,becausetheir
1– to 5–year contracts do not give them any incentive to make long–term invest-
ments.Thesecontractswillbeterminatedifawateruserassociationiscreated.
Land property rights. Most of the interviewees named land fragmentation one of
the main reasons for irrigation problems. Large parts of the internal canal systems,
whichpassthroughprivatelyownedplotshavebeendestroyed.Landfragmentation
also constrains the implementation of the Water User Association Law. This law re-
quires fifty–one percent of the landowners and land users to participate in order to
establishanassociation.
2.4 Additional Factors in the Abandonment of the Irrigation System
Several other factors also deserve attention when investigating the problem of irri-
gation–system abandonment. Among these factors are expectations of water short-
ages in the region, changes to crop structures that require less water, unfavorable
marketconditionsandalternativewater–supplysources.
Water shortage. The agricultural producers in the region did not report any water
shortages. According to the manager of both branches of Irrigation Systems, Ltd.,
the water level in the dams has declined because of insufficient snow and rainfall.
Because water demand for agriculture has also declined, the producers have not yet
felt a shortage. Therefore, water shortage has not been a factor causing the aban-
donment of the irrigation systems in the region. With increasing agricultural pro-
duction,however,itwillplayanimportantrole.
Cost of pumping groundwater. The costs of drilling wells and then pumping water
are considered to be higher than normal water prices according to most of the inter-
viewees. A small water pump costs about 1 000 Leva, and the cost for drilling a well
varies from 20 to 100 Leva per metre. Moreover, the water from the wells has
a much lower temperature compared to canal water and may cause stress on the
plants.
Onlysmall–scalefarmersusedpumpirrigationasamainwater–supplysource.Sev-
eral reasons were expressed by the interviewees for using water from wells. First,
when the canal system does not operate, wells are the only source of water. Second,
it is more convenient for the farmers to have water whenever they need it. Third,
wells provide insurance for eventual problems with the water supply from the ca-
nals.
Changes in crop structure and market conditions. The area of the Plovdiv region
in which perennial crops are grown has decreased significantly from 44 000 hect-
ares in 1988 to 35 000 hectares in 1997 (National Statistical Institute, 1999). How-
12
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privatization process. The area growing wheat has been increasing. The area cov-
ered by corn and rice, which require frequent irrigation, has decreased. Market con-
ditions have contributed to this change as livestock numbers have decreased,
leading to a decreased demand for corn feed. The instability of the water supply,
however, has played even a greater role in the change in crop structure. One of the
interviewed rice producers seriously considered switching to cereals because of the
irregularityofthewatersupply.
The trends in vegetable growing are not as clear as those for cereal cropping. To-
matoes and green peppers are the main vegetable crops in the region. The area
planted with tomatoes has decreased, but that cropped with green peppers has in-
creased. The market conditions have played a decisive role in this situation. Peppers
account for about 30 percent of fresh vegetable export, while tomatoes have a share
ofonly3percent(MinistryofAgricultureandForestry,2000).Consumptioniscom-
paratively stable, consisting of about 30 kg of tomatoes and 10 kg of peppers per ca-
pita.
Most of the interviewees complained about lower prices, the instability of the agri-
culturalproductmarkets(especiallyvegetables)andtheimportofagriculturalprod-
ucts. The manager of the water user association in Katunica said, “… Agricultural
producers in the area make their production decisions blindly. They do not have any
information in advance about what the agricultural product prices would be so that
they could plan their crop structure…” The export of agricultural products has also
declined,andthemarkethasshrunk.
Because irrigation systems do not operate in some villages, people have started to
grow more cereals, but less vegetables and corn (Kadievo, Chamukovi, Kochovo).
These changes, along with the problems of irrigation, have contributed to declining
irrigation–water use (Padarsko, Ruvevo Konare, Malo Konare). Most of the small
agricultural producers do not have access to microcredit. This constrains their op-
portunities to develop agricultural production. The banks are unwilling to provide
loans for agriculture because of the high risk involved. The lack of credit mainly af-
fectssmallagriculturalproducers.
During the interviews, evidence was found repeatedly that a large portion of the
land was abandoned. Therefore, the changes in crop structure (although a response
to declining water resources from irrigation) have also contributed to declining irri-
gation–water use. The area that maintains crops sensitive to irrigation has de-
creased,andtheareathatdoesnotrequireirrigationhasincreased.
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WITH OTHER COUNTRIES IN TRANSITION
The following chapter is a comparison of the water–resource management in the
transition agriculture of Romania, Latvia, East Germany and Bulgaria. This com-
parison has been made because similar problems have occurred in resource man-
agement regimes in post–socialist CEECs (Bromley, 1992: 2). It is very useful to
broaden the investigation to include the situation in other transition countries. In
thiswayakeyobjectiveofthePolicyLearningWorkshop–mutuallearning–canbe
fulfilled.
In Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia and East Germany efficient management of water re-
sources is a key factor for agricultural production. Irrigation cases in Bulgaria and
Romania, a drainage case in Latvia and a hydromelioration case with drainage and
irrigation facilities in East Germany are presented. Background material for this
chapter was provided by the country reports elaborated as outcomes of the Bulgar-
ian 'Study Tour' in March 2002 by Peteris Busmanis and Aija Zobena (Latvia),
ChristianSchleyer(Germany)andIulianaIonel(Romania).






The institutional arrangements that arise are the result of two main driving forces.
These forces are the features and implications of the transactions related to nature




Key features of this framework were selected for comparison in order to exemplify
similarities and differences of the institutions of water–resource management.
Many similarities were found especially in the governance structures of water man-




• property rights to natural components: property rights on land, formal
propertyrightsondrainageandirrigationinfrastructure;
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wateruserassociations,operationandmaintenance.
Inadditionwecomparedthestateoftheagriculturalproductmarkets.
3.1 Properties of Transactions: Technological Conditions
In the following paragraphs general issues applying to technological conditions in
thecase–studyareasaresummarized.
The information about water management in Romania applies to the national level.
On average the climatic and soil conditions make irrigation a precondition for suc-
cessfulagriculturalproduction.
In Latvia two municipalities were analysed, one in the central part and the other in
the western part of the country. Both regions represent average soil fertility with
abandoned land having shares of 16 percent and 19 percent. Latvian soils suffer
from excess water. The average precipitation in Latvia is 700 mm, but
evapotranspiration is only 450 mm. Therefore, drainage is an important precondi-
tion for agricultural use of the land. Drained land makes up 60 percent of the total
agriculturallandinLatvia.
The “Schraden” is a low moor region in East Germany with a long history of
hydromelioration activities. In the 1960s and 1970s the main objective was to inten-
sify agricultural production. Large drainage systems equipped with weirs were built
to optimize groundwater level. The drastically lowered water level and longstanding
intensive farming of this meliorated low moor have led to an increased, and mostly
irreversible,degradationofsoil.Thevisibleconsequencesaredroughtperiodsinthe
summerandwaterloggedplotsinthespring.
Properties of transactions related to nature depend on the physical properties and
material transformations of natural resources and infrastructure characteristics (in-
cluding available technologies). Agro–environmental transactions in the observed
casestudiesinclude,forexample:
• increasing salt concentrations on groundwater–irrigated land in Bul-
garia;
• agrochemicalrun–offfromfloodirrigationinRomania;
• acidification of soils as a result of land abandonment and deteriorating
drainageinfrastructureinLatvia.
Typical for the transactions under review are the inability to exclude free riders and
thehighdegreeofuncertaintyabouttheeffectsofcertainactions.Thetechnological
conditions represent one characteristic in water–resource transactions. In contrast
toBulgaria,theirrigationsysteminRomaniaisbasedtoalargerextentonpumping
water. For this reason irrigation is much more costly. Similar to Bulgaria, the infra-
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frastructure needs large investments to be improved. Also the drainage
infrastructure in Latvia and the machinery of the polder stations need to be reno-
vated.
3.2 Characteristics of Actors: Behavioral and Environmental Concerns
Actorsinvolvedintransactionshavedifferentcapacitiesandintereststoclaimrights
on natural resources. During the transformation process asymmetric power rela-
tions have emerged among different actors. Certain individuals use their power to
maintain their opportunistic strategies and, consequently, they do not agree to any
further rule change. For example, water appropriation rules in place are deliberately
misusedbyafewpowerfulactorstomakeprofit(Theesfeld,2002b:14).Localpower
abuse is a behavioural attribute typical of actors in the transformation process.
There are strong incentives for government officials to use their power to serve their
own interests. Numerous key positions, including mayoral and other municipality
posts,offeropportunitiestogainadvantage.
Corruption is a common power strategy occurring quite frequently concerning irri-
gation systems because irrigation institutions create many such opportunities. One
form of corruption in the irrigation sector is withholding the delivery of water from
those entitled to it in order to receive illegal payments on the side (of money, com-




and resources to exert influence. Also, groups of individuals (like communities) use
networks to shape institutions according to their objectives (Hagedorn et al., 2002:
5).
In the Schraden case, interests supporting nature conservation appear and call for
land use that is better adapted to the habitat. Some stakeholder groups create con-
flictsoverprioritieswithagriculturalproducers.
Most local actor groups feel that drained–landscape changes and land abandon-
ment do not have a positive impact on biodiversity, though environmental concerns
are rarely expressed by local actors. So far, in Bulgaria no environmentally con-
cernedstakeholdergrouphascalledforproperirrigationmanagementtoreducethe
risk of either soil salinization or decreasing groundwater levels. Similarly, in Latvia
the environmental impact from badly maintained drainage systems is less severe
and hardly any local actor group regards drainage maintenance important for envi-
ronmental protection. Especially in Romania and Bulgaria, economic pressures on
small– and medium–sized farms (plus the lack of alternative income sources) force
farmers to pursue short–term profits instead of investing in environmentally
17
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for environmentally friendly farming, as well as the lack of human capital (educa-
tion,expertise)andconstrainedaccesstoinformation.
3.3 Property Rights on Nature Components
Property rights on natural components determine the distribution of cost and bene-
fit streams originating from the use of a natural resource. This approach is often
misunderstood as an approach explaining the definition and distribution of disposi-
tion rights focusing on physical entities, i.e. material goods. However, property
rights refer to bundles of rights and duties, as different entities may enjoy different
rights and obligations for different components of a resource (Hagedorn et al.,
2002:13;forfurtherdiscussionseeSikor,2002:11).
Property rights on land. Land fragmentation is judged to be one of the main rea-
sonsfortheproblemsintheirrigationsector.Thefragmentationisaconsequenceof
the restitution of land to historical owners and the dominance of smallholdings in
thepre–collectivizedlandownershipstructure.InEastGermany,RomaniaandLat-
via the extensive systems of channels, ditches and water regulation facilities were
designed to serve large production units (cooperatives and state farms). Now, after
thelandrestitutionprocesses,theinfrastructuredoesnotmeettheneedsofthelarge
numberofsmalllandowners.
The transformation process reveals a heterogeneous agricultural production with
requirements that vary by farm size and location (top–end or tail–end plots), crop-
ping structure, production know–how and economic performance (Theesfeld,
2001). Almost all new owners in the Schraden case decided to lease their land to the
new,restructuredandreorganizedagriculturalfirms.Asaresult,about10000haof
agricultural land is currently farmed by 13 farming enterprises. In contrast, in Ro-
maniathenewprivatelandownerslargelydecidedtostayoutofcooperativeproduc-
tion. Therefore, the individual private household or family farm became the
predominanttypeoffarming.Thereare3.9millionfarmswithanaveragesizeof2.3
hectares estimated in Romania compared to the previous 5 000 cooperative farms.
ThisfragmentationappliestoLatviaaswell.Inaddition,Latvia'scomparativelyset-
tled formal land property rights do not create any advantages for solving problems
relatedtodrainage,drainagerestorationandmaintenance.
Formal property rights on drainage and irrigation systems. Bulgaria, Romania
and East Germany are similar in that the irrigation sectors started to be reorganized
in the late 1990s (in East Germany in 1994), after the land restitution process had





Irrigation and Water Regulation Systems in Transition: The Case of Bulgaria in Comparison with Latvia, East Germany and RomaniaAccordingtotheLawonLandReclamation(1993),theuseandownershipofdrain-
age infrastructures were specified between the state, the public and private respon-
sibilities. Regarding the common service characteristics of the drainage systems,
however,dutiesseemunclearandunevenlydistributed(Busmanisetal.,2002).
3.4 Governance Structures
Governance structures for environmental coordination shape how transactions take
place. Usually three categories of governance structures are distinguished: markets,
hierarchies or hybrid forms – also called contractual relations or horizontal
non–market coordination (Hagedorn et al., 2002: 14). Governance structures com-
prise knowledge dissemination, monitoring measures, conflict–resolution mecha-
nism,enforcementmechanismsandstrategiesforinnovationandlearning.
State monopoly of water supply. As in Bulgaria, in Romania an irrigation
state–monopolyfirmmanageswatersupply.InRomania,thestatefirmsweretrans-
formed into formally autonomous commercial companies and were permitted to di-
versify their activities beyond irrigation and drainage matters. Because of severely
reduced budget allocations, the firms started to neglect maintenance of the irriga-
tion and drainage facilities and shifted their business focus to other business deal-
ings. In 1994, the government of Romania established a state–owned centralized
Regie Autonome of Land Reclamation (RAIF). It was created to be the principal na-
tionalagencyresponsibleforirrigationmanagementinRomania.
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Figure 4: Management of the Irrigation Sector in BulgariaIn Bulgaria and Romania, the state firms are responsible for distributing water to
agricultural land. However, their responsibility is limited to the main canals. The
distribution within the internal canal system is the responsibility of the municipali-
ties,theformercooperativefarmsorthesmallprivatefarmers.Inaddition,currently
there is no clearly designated authority in Romania for the distribution of water be-
yond the main canal system. The state firm has neither the necessary means nor in-
terest to take measures to protect against the high water losses caused by often
deliberatelybrokeninternalcanalsandwatertheft.Waterdistributionwithinthein-
ternal canals is rarely monitored. These outcomes in both countries are caused by
the fact that the state firm is financed by socially acceptable water charges paid by
thefarmers,aswellasbysubstantialstatesubsidies.Thepriceofwateriscontrolled
by the state and the charged fee does not correlate to the costs of irrigation–water
management. The water price in most cases is not calculated based on the actual
amountofwaterreachingtheplot.
In the East German Schraden Region, no substantial implementation took place of
new rules and structures for the water management and planning system at the ad-
ministrative levels until 1992. At that time the Water Management Directorate
(WMD) ‘Oder Havel’ was dissolved. In Brandenburg, only those tasks for which the
Water Management Directorates and the ‘Kreise’ had been responsible were safe-
guarded by the ‘Land Environment Agency’. This agency operated like a successor
in interest to the WMD. In 1994, the Brandenburg Water Act established a new ad-
ministrative structure, which basically follows the example of the old ‘Länder’, putt-
ing emphasis on self–government on the communal level. Figure 5 gives a brief
overview of the different administrative layers of Water Authorities and Water
Agencies in Brandenburg in relation to the ‘Landkreis Elbe–Elster’ after 1994
(Schleyer,2002).
Water User Associations. In Bulgaria and Romania the World Bank supported
projects to establish Water User Associations (WUA). Direct management and ad-
ministration of the infrastructure by landowners and users represent forms of
self–governance. The objective is that these associations receive the usage rights of
the canal systems. They represent collective action solutions to ensure sustainable
resourceuse.BulgariaenforcedtheWaterUserAssociationActin2001,andRoma-
niaenforcedtheGovernmentOrdinancein2000.Bothlegalactsbuildthelegislative
framework for the WUAs, among other issues, and regulate the establishment and
registration procedures and the ownership transfer of the irrigation infrastructure
from the state firm to the associations. Many WUAs were founded on paper, but in
practice only a small number of these WUAs in Bulgaria and Romania are actively
functioningatthelocallevel(Theesfeld,2002a:174).InLatviacooperationbetween
farmers and landowners is insufficient for the maintenance of public drainage sys-
tems.
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In East Germany, the new Water Act of 1994 formally attributed the duties to main-
tain and clean the large network of small ditches to semi–state water associations.
This was done to ensure the necessary water run–off and hence to avoid damage by
floods or high groundwater tables. This current administrative structure puts more
emphasis on self–governing and self–organization. The associations were founded
all over the country and their structure followed the West German model (Schleyer,
2002). Unlike in Bulgaria and Romania, membership is compulsory for municipali-
ties and for those landowners not subject to rates. Effectively, the tenant pays the
membershipfee,whichonlycorrespondstothesizeoftheland,asanimplicitpartof
the rent. These revenues, however, are not supplemented by state subsidies and
coveronlyapartofthemaintenancecostsoftheweirs.Sincemostoftheseweirsare
now legally owned by the respective landowner, the water association must get per-
mission from them before beginning any activity. Due to their limited statutory
rights in conjunction with their small financial resources, the present water associa-
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Figure 5: Water Authorities and Water Agencies Operating in the Schradentions do not appear to be an adequate substitute for the pre–1989 melioration coop-
eratives.
Operationandmaintenance.Duetothesmallsizeoftheplotsandtheinterconnec-
tedness of the canal system, maintaining small parts of the system would only make
sense if all farmers along a canal would cooperate and share the responsibilities.
Certain transactions, such as avoiding the cleaning of canals or simply irrigating
a plot, always impose positive or negative external effects for neighbouring farmers,
such as flooding fields or nutrient run–off. Moreover, free–riding occurs quite fre-
quently in irrigation systems. According to Ostrom (1992: 32–33), free–riding is de-
fined as investing time in private activities while others are investing in joint activities
(suchascanalmaintenance)thatincreasethesupplyofwaterovertimetoallusers.
A new water act was enforced in 1994 in East Germany and at the end of the 1990s
in Bulgaria. In both cases, the new law did not fully solve the problem of unclear
rights and duties for the maintenance and operation of the melioration system. The
long–term legal insecurities, the fragmented land ownership structure and a large
number of short–term leasehold contracts certainly reduced the incentives for most
farmers to maintain or to invest in facilities. More than ten years of transformation
worsened the situation, resulting in the deterioration of the major parts of the water
management facilities that are now operating in an uncoordinated or even unautho-
rizedmanner.
22
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Figure 6: Overgrown Internal CanalThesameappliestoRomania,wheretheoverallperformanceoftheirrigationsector
has substantially declined. Due to reduced maintenance the schemes have steadily
degraded. In the Latvian drainage case the network problem also matters, as the
land–ownership borders were set according to the former land borders and did not
take into account the borders of hydrological watershed and drainage systems. This
hascreatedaninterdependenceamongneighbouringfarmersinthemaintenanceof
drainagesystems.
3.5 Agricultural Product Markets
In Bulgaria, Romania and Latvia the agricultural product markets are a major con-
cern,particularlyregardingthelackofmarketinfrastructure.Atthestartofthemar-
keting chain there are insufficient or uncompetitive transport and storage
capacities. Other insufficiencies are the poorly organized commodity markets and
badly developed price information systems. All this leads to high levels of planning
insecurity when crop decisions have to be taken, i.e. during planting season. There-
fore,manyfarmers,andespeciallythelargeragriculturalproducers(tenantsandco-
operative farms), stay away from intensively irrigated crops, as these require more
labour and capital. This is one reason that has led to the decline in irrigated agricul-
turalareaandthedeteriorationoftheirrigationsystem.
The causal connections concerning declining markets and insufficient market infra-
structure on irrigated land (and vice versa) are still being debated among scientists
(Penov, 2002: 15). These causalities also apply for the drainage infrastructure in
Latvia. Underdeveloped agricultural product markets lead to land abandonment,
which in turn leads to the deterioration of drainage infrastructure. In East Germany
the uncertainties that farmers faced because of a lack of information about the agri-
cultural product markets were solved more quickly than in other Eastern European




In summary, various similarities were identified among the water resource manage-
ment practices in Romania, Latvia, East Germany and Bulgaria. The reforms of
property rights on land (especially the resulting large degree of land fragmentation)
have created problems for the irrigation and drainage infrastructure, which was for-
merlybuilttoservelargeproductionunits.Propertyrightstotheinfrastructure,par-
ticularly the distribution of duties and responsibilities, are unclear and lead to
maintenanceandoperationproblems.Severalwateruserassociationswereformally
established in an attempt to create more self–organization at the local level. How-
ever, a discrepancy between the formal legislation and the effectiveness on the
ground can be identified in all the compared cases. Likewise, the conditions of the ag-
riculturalproductmarketsaffectthesituationintheirrigationanddrainagesector.
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Irrigation and Water Regulation Systems in Transition: The Case of Bulgaria in Comparison with Latvia, East Germany and RomaniaCompared to Bulgaria, differing features were found regarding the technological
conditionsandthecharacteristicsoftheactorsinvolved.InRomaniathetechnologi-
cal condition of the irrigation infrastructure relies to a larger extent on pumping fa-
cilities. At present, only in East Germany have actors with environmental concerns
emerged. Several additional aspects influence the institutional change in water re-
source management, such as the power asymmetries of local actors, opportunistic
behaviourandtheimplicationofEUaccession.Theserequirefurtherdiscussion.
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During the day devoted to discussion the participants of the Policy Learning Work-
shopcarriedoutaproblemanalysisbydividingthewiderangeofproblemsintofour
categories.Eachcategoryreferstoproblematiccircumstancesconcerningthebuild-














































































Irrigation and Water Regulation Systems in Transition: The Case of Bulgaria in Comparison with Latvia, East Germany and Romania5 OPTIONS FOR SUSTAINABLE
IRRIGATION INSTITUTIONS
In the previous sections the factors that have driven the abandonment of irrigation
systemsinBulgariawereinvestigated.Itwasfoundthat,amongotherfactors,exist-








In addition to the institutional issues, the instability of agricultural product prices
and low farm income levels has also contributed to the abandonment of the irriga-
tionsystems.
Themainobjectiveoftheinstitutionalchangesistoadapttheirrigationsystem’sop-
eration and infrastructure to the economic, ecological and social conditions of the
area.Anothermainobjectiveistostimulateimprovementinwaterusage,waterallo-
cation efficiency and equity by giving adequate incentives. In the following subsec-
tion, we aim at developing institutional options for the sustainable management of
irrigation systems in the Plovdiv region. These options are based on the research
carried out by the authors and the exchange of knowledge and expertise among the
participantsofthePolicyLearningWorkshop.
5.1 Actors' Characteristics
Four types of actors are involved in irrigation in Bulgaria: small producers, large
producers,theirrigationcompanyandlocalmunicipalities.
Small agricultural producers have knowledge of the local irrigation systems but in-
sufficient organizational skills. In addition, many of them are either in or close to re-
tirement. They are typically risk averse and invest limited resources in agricultural
activities;thustheirbenefitsandlossesfromirrigationarenotsignificant.Formany
of them, however, agriculture is an important income–generating activity. The
smallfarmerscooperateinordertoorganizetheirrigationprocess.However,theco-
operation occurs on a small scale and is locally isolated. In addition, because they
cultivate small plots, the revenues the water suppliers receive from individual pro-
ducers are negligible. In their opinion, the irrigation company does not care about
their interests. Therefore, the actors within the small agricultural producer group
havethefollowingmaincharacteristics:
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Large producers have better organizational skills. Many of them also have knowl-
edge about the local irrigation systems. They invest considerable resources in agri-
culturalactivitiesandthereforetheireventuallossesandbenefitsfromirrigationare
substantial. Because they cultivate large plots, the revenue that the irrigation com-
pany receives from an individual farmer is considerable. Some of them do not live in
the villages, but rent land. Therefore, the main characteristics of the large farmers
(comparedtosmallproducers)are:betterfinancialresourcesandorganizationalca-
pacity,aswellasastrongerbargainingposition.
The irrigation company has organized the water supply in the areas for many years.
The specialists working in the firm have organizational skills and because of their
established business and political contacts they are well–informed about new laws,
prices and policies. The knowledge of the firm's specialists concerning irrigation in-
frastructure is indispensable. Often, the only way water can reach the fields is
through canals controlled by the company. The company tries to provide reliable
water supply to the large farmers, but believes that the small farmers would steal
28
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Local municipalities have knowledge about the local irrigation systems and they
have appropriate organizational skills. They are not directly affected by the irriga-
tion problems but are directly involved in water distribution issues. For instance,
they manage small water dams and receive revenue from tenants involved in fishery
at the dams. By doing so the tenants of the water dam cause downstream problems
with water availability, especially in the summer period when conflicts arise over
water use for fishery and for irrigation. In some villages, the mayors play an impor-






5.2 Policies Affecting Institutional Options
The choice of institutional options is closely related to the existing farming systems
and the type of farms that predominate in the region. The current land and agricul-
tural income policy influence these two determinants. The options are also directly
influencedbythestateirrigationpolicy.
The Bulgarian irrigation policy is outlined several documents: the “Strategy for de-
velopment of irrigation in Bulgaria under the conditions of a market economy”
(Petkovetal.,2000),theWaterLaw,theWaterUserAssociationLawandtheExec-
utiveHydromeliorationAgencyStructuralRules.
The main goals of the “Strategy for development of irrigation in Bulgaria under the
conditionsofamarketeconomy”aretherestructuringandadaptationofownership,
management and usage of hydromelioration infrastructure to market conditions
and private land ownership. The restructuring is based on several principles. Some
ofthemare:




Irrigation and Water Regulation Systems in Transition: The Case of Bulgaria in Comparison with Latvia, East Germany and Romania• decentralizationandde–monopolization;
• sustainablewatermanagement.
The reform's intended duration is 20 years and consists of three stages. The main
goal of the first stage (1999 – 2006) is to set the administrative, institutional and le-
gal preconditions for development of irrigation. The main goal of the second stage
(2007 – 2012)istocreateconditionsforimprovingirrigation–systemefficiencyand
developing an information system for water management. The main target of the
thirdstage(2013 – 2020)istostabilizetheresultsofthereform.
The Bulgarian Water Law was designed in accordance with the strategy outlined
above. It introduces water management at the river–basin level and promotes par-
ticipation of non–governmental organizations. The law specifies the property rights
forwater usage fromwater resources and infrastructure and also outlines themech-
anisms for coordination of the different actors involved. The water law anticipates
the establishment of water user associations and specifies their main rights and du-
ties.
30








Figure 8: Factors Influencing Institutional ChoiceThe main elements of the Water User Association Act are: (1) transferring owner-
ship of internal canal systems from the state to agricultural producers; and (2)
changing the direction of the decision–making process from top–down to bot-
tom–up. In other words, the intention is to have the decisions made by the actors
who are most affected by them – namely, agricultural producers. An association of
water users can be established by at least 51 percent of the landowners or users who
own or cultivate more that 51 percent of the land on the territory. In addition, only




The legislation also anticipates the full coverage of the investment and operation
cost regarding irrigation by WUAs. In this respect, two types of water charges are
foreseen: fixed charge per hectare of irrigated land to recover investment and vari-
able fees for covering operation and maintenance cost. However, the state is in-
volved in investment and maintenance of the irrigation equipment. Fund
“melioration” has been created in order to facilitate investing in irrigation with re-
sources from the state budget. Presently, the resources from this fund are used
mainly for maintenance and reconstruction of the existing irrigation systems and
also for the completion of already initiated projects. The state also intends to sup-
portinvestmentsontheterritoryofthenewlyestablishedWUA.AccordingtotheAct
of financial support of WUAs (State Gazette, 2002) the state can pay for up to 80
percentoftheinvestmentsinirrigationinfrastructure.
In summary, the Bulgarian irrigation policy is oriented towards devolving irrigation
systemmanagementandpropertyrightstothewaterusers.Thepolicyoffersoneor-
ganizational form, i.e. water user association. The law's requirements concerning
thenumberoflandownersneededtoinitiatethe WUAestablishmentprocessaredif-
ficulttomeet.Inaddition,onlyafewpeoplecanreadandunderstandthelaworeven
know about the new law. Therefore, there is a considerable discrepancy between le-
gal texts and practice. In light of this, short–term support in the form of agricultural




this respect. The Land Law imposes restrictions on plot size. The minimum plot
sizes (in hectares) are 0.3 for arable land, 0.2 for meadows and 0.1 for orchards.
This policy, while partially solving the problem of land fragmentation, also creates
new problems. Plots below these sizes are categorized as having group ownership
and no single inheritor can make decisions about the plot independently. This even-
tuallywillhindertheevolutionofthelandmarket.
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bill,thestateorganizeslandconsolidationwiththepresumptionofvoluntarypartic-
ipation and equal treatment of landowners. The process of land consolidation could
beinitiatedupontherequestof:
• fifty percent of land owners in the area or landowners who possess
two–thirdsofthelandtobeconsolidated;
• tenant farmers that cultivate more than two–thirds of the land with the
writtenagreementofthelandowners.
In order to accelerate the process of land consolidation a tax was also proposed (10
to300Levaperhectare)forarablelandthatisnotbeingcultivated.
The Land Consolidation Law, if passed by parliament, would have a marginal im-
pact on land fragmentation in Bulgaria. The requirement concerning the number of
landowners or land users who can initiate the consolidation process is difficult to
meet. Also, complete land consolidation is possible only in a limited number of ar-
eas. Even if consolidation were implemented in the very near future, Bulgarian agri-
culturewouldstillfacethesameproblembecauseofinheritancelawsandtraditions.
In addition, the reform may be welcomed by people directly involved in agricultural
production, but may be resisted by the landowners, who are in the majority now.
Therefore, the political party that attempts to implement the Land Consolidation
Lawislikelytoloseaconsiderablenumberofvotes.
The “Agriculture” state fund provides a guarantee for agricultural producers who
want to purchase land. The guarantee is worth up to 135 000 Leva for a period of 5
years. The banks are supposed to provide credit from their own resources and ac-
cording to their rules. The “Agriculture” fund guarantees the credits, but requires
the land and additional assets to be used as collateral amounting to 130 percent of




land market in Bulgaria. On this website agricultural producers who want to sell,
buy, or rent land can publish announcements. It is also possible to obtain informa-
tion about the land price in different regions. The reported land prices in some re-
gions, however, are unreasonably high, which suggests that the land has not been
purchasedforagriculturalproduction.
In summary, Bulgarian land policy aims at enlarging land parcels. The attempts
have been made in two ways: (1) development of land market and (2) land consoli-
dation through law. Although land restitution has already been completed, expecta-
tions that the land market will operate better in the near future are not very high.
Alawthatcaninitiateaneffectivelandconsolidationprocessisnotlikelytobevoted
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atleastinnearfuture.
The Bulgarian farm–income policy. The Bulgarian farm–income policy officially
supports medium–sized family farms. In this respect, several programs were initi-
ated.TheLawforProtectionofAgriculturalProductionwaspassedbyparliamentin






The law established the “Agriculture” state fund as a special tool for policy imple-
mentation. Most of these measures have never been fully implemented due to a lack
offinancialresourcesandtheprioritygiventosupportconsumers.
The Law for Supporting Agricultural Producers was implemented in 1998, and the
lawof1995wasabolished.Thislawintendedtosupportindividuals,aswellasorga-
nizations of agricultural producers. It established the National Advisory Bureau for
Agriculture and reformulated the goals and instruments of the “Agriculture” state
fund. According to this law, the main agricultural policy instruments are: (1) pro-
duction subsidies, (2) credits, (3) interest rate subsidies and (4) credit guarantees.
The direct price–support programs were abandoned (Ministry of Agriculture and
Forestry, 2000). Regardless of the legislation's good intentions, the credit market








Mainly large farmers can benefit from the available programmes. Therefore, the
dualfarmstructureofBulgarianagricultureislikelytopersistforalongtime.
The Bulgarian Water Law. The Bulgarian Water Law has been designed accord-
ing to EU legislation and also with World Bank support. The same applies to the
WaterUserAssociationLaw.Therefore,thereisaclosematchbetweenthenational
and EU policies in this respect. Investment in irrigation systems is supported by the




Irrigation and Water Regulation Systems in Transition: The Case of Bulgaria in Comparison with Latvia, East Germany and Romania• drainage, river beds corrections, building and renovation of ditches and
forestationforprotectionalongrivers;
• completionofwaterdamsandtheattachedhydromeliorationsystems.
Recipients under this programme can also be state organizations. The programme
doesnotsupporton–farminvestmentsinirrigation.
Thefifthmeasureofthe SAPARDprogrammestimulatesthedevelopmentofagricul-
tural producer organizations. Although this measure is not especially designed to
support organizations of water users, it stimulates joint actions and cooperation
amongagriculturalproducers.
In summary, the Bulgarian state policies on land, farm income and irrigation policy
are consistent. Land policy aims at the enlargement of cultivated plots. Farm–in-
come policy aims at creating economically viable medium–sized family farms. Such
farmers will eventually have longer planning horizons and a greater incentive to op-
timize inputs (including water) compared with subsistence and aged agricultural
producers. In this situation the irrigation policy favours the establishment of WUAs.
The problem is that the number of medium–sized family farms is still very small,
and it is not likely to increase in near future. Large producers can organize water
supply individually in an efficient way and eventually they will have no incentive to
initiate the process of establishing WUAs. Therefore, the WUA currently is not likely
to lead to the satisfactory solution of the irrigation problems in Bulgaria. Moreover,
it is necessary to rebuild and strengthen social and human capital, which are neces-
saryforcollectiveaction.
5.3 Description of Selected Institutional Options
The participants of the Policy Learning Workshop in Plovdiv, Bulgaria identified
anddiscussedfourinstitutionaloptionsforsolvingirrigationwaterproblems:
Option 1: Farmers participate in the decision–making process of Irrigation Sys-
tems Ltd. Under this option farmers' representatives are included in the deci-
sion–makingprocessforwaterallocationandinvestmentbytheirrigationcompany.
This option is a response to the local monopoly problem. It requires changes in the
governance structure, particularly the rules of water supply. Depending on the
rights and duties granted to the representatives, it might require changes in prop-
ertyrightsonthemaincanals.
Option 2: Local municipalities organize irrigation water supply. Under this op-
tion the local municipalities organize the irrigation water supply on their territory.
This option is a reaction to the inadequate local coordination through the hierarchy
and requires changes in the property rights on the secondary canals and increased
rights and duties attributed to the local municipalities. Under this option, the agri-
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thepoliticalprocess).
Option 3: Non–governmental organizations (shareholding companies, small
water user groups and water user associations) provide irrigation water. Under
thisoptiontheWaterUserAssociationswerediscussed.Associationsofwaterusers
are frequently recommended as forms of self–governance organizations. Under this
optionfarmerscooperateinordertooperatealarge,distinctpartoftheirrigationin-
frastructure.AccordingtoOstrom(1992)thisformprovidesanopportunityforsus-
tainable water management. The conflict would be almost fully internalized and,
provided that the rights and duties are clearly identified, the water users would de-
velopmechanismsforconflictresolution.
Option 4: Joint management. This option suggests that the firm Irrigation Sys-
tems, Ltd. and potential Water User Associations collaborate in the management of
irrigationwater.
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OF INSTITUTIONAL OPTIONS
During the discussions it became obvious that the problems with irrigation agricul-
turearemorecomplexthanmerelydecliningwateruseordestroyedirrigationinfra-
structure. The problems are multi–faceted, and the re–organization of the
institutional and technological irrigation infrastructure itself is only one component
ofthecomplexity.Theseproblemsareembeddedinlarger–scalecontexts.
Each of the problems discussed has a different weight based on the socio–cultural
and economic environments of the villages in which they can be observed. In gen-
eral, it seemed to be easier to establish networks of trust and collaboration in areas
where people do not need to worry about basic survival strategies. It was commonly
agreedthatthecrucialproblemsofirrigation–watermanagementintheregionwere
relatedtoissuesofintegratedruraldevelopment.Problemsrelatedtothere–organi-
zation of water distribution were perceived to be less of a limiting factor compared
withruraldevelopmentproblemssuchasruralpoverty,lackofeducationandaccess
to information, as well as other issues like a less reliable legal system, rent–seeking
activitiesandcorruption.
From the perspective of several stakeholders it was made clear that organizational
problems of water management are only one task to be solved. From different stake-
holders it was emphasized that clear rules, strict controls, laws and monitoring
would essentially improve the entire confusion and dispute surrounding the water
management problem. This idea seems to be closely related to the peoples' mental
models, which show a strong affinity towards patterns of control and command.
The government has tried to cope with increasing complexity by increasing control
and order. Commissions and agencies have been established to supervise irrigation
activities. However, these mechanisms clearly do not work any longer in the period
oftransition.
The behaviour of farmers, which partly is a result of such unfavourable starting po-
sitions, was often viewed by the irrigation company or the Ministry of Agriculture,
aslackingmotivationandinteresttochangethings.Itremainsunclearwhichincen-
tives are needed to motivate the farmers. Few ideas were presented about what
could motivate farmers towards institutional change and what could be the entry
point for such innovation. Solutions, which are of immediate interest for farmers,
werenotsuggested.Thissuggeststhatbeingabletodesigninstitutionalalternatives
is more relevant than the institutional design itself. However, among the more pow-
erful actors (e.g. the Irrigation Systems, Ltd. or local municipality) there seemed to
be consensus that the poorest farmers needed pressure to fulfill their duties con-
nectedtothewatersupply(e.g.payingforwater).
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lematicgroup,althoughfordifferentreasons.Otheractors(MinistryofAgriculture,
Irrigation Systems, Ltd., municipalities) very often took a patronistic attitude to-
wards the problems of poor farmers. The Ministry of Agriculture's attitude towards
these farmers was one of good will and readiness to support. However, the farmers
wererequiredtoinformtheMinistryofAgricultureaboutknowledgegapsandother
problems. The usual procedure suggested by the representatives of the Ministry of
Agriculture was to ask the farmers to write a letter to the Ministry of Agriculture re-
questingsupport.Incontrast,themayorofonemunicipalityactedasifheknewbest
what the farmers needed most. He explained that they wouldn't have to think about
WUAs because they could not come up with the initial investments necessary to run
a WUA. In addition, the farmers were described as being disinterested because they
did not attend a meeting that the mayor scheduled in order to discuss WUA estab-
lishment with the farmers. Unfortunately the meeting was held during their work
time.
Despite the willingness of the Ministry of Agriculture to help solve farmers' prob-
lems and inform them about the new WUA law, none of the actors (including the
farmers) complained about lacking an agricultural advisory service. Access to infor-
mation and training obviously was a problem, but it was not recognized as one be-
cause there has never been such a service. There have also been no mediating
non–governmental organizations or branches of farmers' organizations that would
be able to represent the farmers' interests. An intermediate level of communication
hasbeencompletelyabsent.
The status quo regarding the opportunities and constraints for institutional innova-
tion is an unfortunate situation. The driving forces towards institutional change
have been hindered by several factors, such as interests to preserve the positions of









Irrigation System Ltd. and the Ministry of Agriculture have different visions of how
the future could look. From the viewpoint of Irrigation Systems, Ltd., a good solu-
tion would be joint stock companies. All farmers would buy a share of the company
and receive water based on contractual relations to the company. The Ministry of
Agriculture in turn promotes WUAs. Both parties have good arguments for their
proposals, however both would require the collaboration of the diverse agricultural
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causetheyarenewtothecountry.
TheMinistryofAgricultureisespeciallyawareofthefactthatalawfor WUAwillnot
guarantee the successful establishment and operation of a WUA, and experience
with bottom–up approaches is necessary. Participatory approaches are required in
the selection of new institutions for sustainable water management. The state was
viewed as having an important role during transition towards sustainability. State
involvement is needed in order to set the preconditions for self–governance, espe-
ciallyforsocietiesinwhichthestateplayedanimportantroleinthepast.
Without social cohesion among farmers and lacking sufficient access to informa-
tion, farmers are prevented from acting in their own interest. This was regarded as
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FOR SUSTAINABLE IRRIGATION AGRICULTURE
The expert–participants of the Policy Learning Workshop suggested that it was
probably too costly to irrigate marginal areas in the future, and that the size of the
area under irrigation would never reach its pre–1990 level. Proposals were dis-
cussed for different organizational and institutional forms that would manage irri-
gation systems and water distribution. All the proposed options, including joint
solutions,couldprobablyaddressmostproblemsiftheywerewelldesigned,showed
sufficientlevelsofparticipationandfairlydistributedcostsandbenefits.
The options with most chance of success are those that address the most urgent so-
cial and rural–development problems. Presently, such options would not be feasible
without state involvement. Of course, this requires a “strong state” not dominated
by rent seekers, suggesting that an organizational form can only be successful if ru-
ral development problems would be addressed simultaneously. This would require
substantial investments in agricultural advisory services, giving organizations addi-





• Few additional organizational structures re-
quiredandlowcostsforsuchstructures.
• Rapidimplementationpossible.
• Increased legitimacy for Irrigation Systems,
Ltd.
• More communication required between Irriga-
tion Systems, Ltd. and farmers (possibly im-









• Possible decrease in legitimacy if no change in
practice.
• Lack of acceptance by Irrigation Systems of







• Legitimizing the survival of an organization
withsoftbudgetconstraints.
• Weakconsultativebodyhavinglittlepower.
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41Option2:Localmunicipalities
• Acceptedleaders(mayor).







• Conflict between municipalities managing the
samecanalsystems.
• No direct participation by farmers in water
management decisions.




• No clear connection between large producers
andanyonemunicipality.
• Clash of local problems and need for
transboundarydecision–making.
• Dangerofmisuseofwatercharges.










• Clear internal rules, including conflict resolu-
tionmechanisms.
• Possibilitytohirespecialists.
• Clear division between hydromeliorative prop-
ertyrights.
• Possibility to establish a union and increase
competition.
• Greatflexibilitytomeetlocalwaterdemands.











• Little incentive for subsistence farmers to join;
smallfarmers'problemsnotsolved.
• Conflicts and competing interests between
WUAandIrrigationSystems,Ltd.
• Difficultytomaintainthemaincanals.
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• Possible difficulty in coordinating deci-
sion–making.
• Presuppositionofpre–existingandfunctioning
organizations (WUA and Irrigation Systems,
Ltd.).
During the workshop the previously identified options were drawn together and
evaluated. The evaluation aimed at collecting and discussing the strengths and
weaknesses of each option. Table 3 gives an overview of the options and their
strengthsandweaknesses.
Followingthediscussionsitbecameclearthateachoptionhasitsownstrengthsand
weaknesses. Therefore, no single option – but rather a mixture of institutional op-
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The difficulties of establishing new irrigation institutions in Bulgaria during transi-
tionneedtobeviewedinthecontextofavarietyofobstacles,manyofwhicharespe-
cific to Bulgaria. Land restitution in Bulgaria has led to land fragmentation.
Cooperatives, which coordinated not only agricultural activity but also social life in
the village, were abolished before alternative forms emerged. Formal legislation for
irrigation is already in place, but some of the structures have yet to be established.
When the formal procedures for land reform ended in 2000, Bulgarian farm struc-
ture was dominated by three groups: small subsistence farms (operated by people
near retirement), cooperatives (most in a poor financial state) and large commercial
farms.Thenumberofmedium–sizedfamilyfarmsremainedsmall.
The existing governance structure contributes to the abandonment of the irrigation
system. The monitoring system is somewhat developed for main canals, but absent
from internal canals. In addition, stealing irrigation equipment and water is a prob-
lem. The unwillingness of the water users to participate in the monitoring process
further intensifies these problems. The problems affect mainly the internal canal
system and to a lesser extent the main canal system operated by the irrigation com-
pany.Waterpricesarefixedregardlessofplotpositionandsize.Smallproducersare
charged per hectare, which lessens their incentives to participate in the monitoring
process.Moreover,chargingperhectareresultsinmorewaterusagecomparedwith
charging per cubic metre. Land fragmentation causes coordination problems when
only small areas need to be irrigated. This increases the cost for the water supplier
and lowers its incentives to provide services to small producers. Conflict–resolution
mechanisms are poorly developed. Rent–seeking activities of actors involved in wa-
ter management and distribution are overarching problems and hinder institutional
change.
The formal sanction mechanisms seem to work only in the case of large water users,
but not in the case of small users. Existing property rights have contributed to the
decline in irrigation water usage. The legal ownership of water and the main canal
systems is partially exercised. Irrigation Systems, Ltd. bears a portion of the costs
and does not receive all the possible revenues from the system. The property rights
ontheinternalcanalsystemsarenotexercised.Thelocalmunicipalitiesneitherbear
the costs nor receive benefits from them; only in some occasions some management
is done by the water users. Land fragmentation further deepens the problem be-
cause it prevents the application of modern production technologies and therefore
makes agricultural production less competitive. Land fragmentation also increases
monitoring and transaction costs, and hence the effectiveness of conflict resolution
andsanctioningmechanismsdecreases.
Besides institutional factors, changes in crop structure have contributed to the de-
cline of irrigation water usage. The area that maintains crops sensitive to irrigation
44




ated. The option to organize irrigation through ‘local municipalities’ is appropriate
for places (mainly small villages) with insufficient social capital and many small
farmers (who have a short planning horizon). Its implementation demands a low
cost for establishing the system but a comparatively high cost to operate it after-
wards. This option shares some characteristics with the option in which the state
takes over organizational responsibility. Both cases respond to the coordination
problemcausedbyhierarchy.
The option proposing ‘non–state organization of water supply’ is appropriate for
places with sufficient social capital. It best matches the features of transactions and
has the strongest positive effect on resource usage. However, with this option the
problem arises about who will initiate the process of institutional change and how.
Small farmers with a short to medium planning horizon can initiate the process of
establishing small water user groups. Small water user groups could be considered
a transition step towards the establishment of water user associations. Only small–
to medium–scale farmers with a long planning horizon can initiate the establish-
ment of WUAs. The problem is that there are few farmers with such characteristics
inBulgaria.
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